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Abstract
This paper investigates how subcontracting parts of contracted work shapes entrants’
success and survival. We find that newly developed quantile regression approaches
can be adapted to study survival of firms competing for government contracts in road
construction. The method is applied on a data set that includes patterns of firm entry,
exit and auction related information. We find an apparent increase in the business life of
firms who subcontract out part of their projects. In Texas, these subcontracting effects
appear to be more pronounced for firms with few or no options outside the industry, and
among firms who contract out part of their work to Disadvantaged Business Enterprises.
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1 Introduction
Subcontracting allows a firm to unbundle contracts and share tasks with a network of business
competitors, thus capitalizing on firm asymmetric strengths. The use of subcontractors
varies across procurement auction settings, and the choices made affect entry and bidding.1
Little is known, however, about the effect of subcontracting on firm survival and whether
it has a differential impact across competitors by their level of market experience. In this
paper, we take a closer look at subcontracting and its effect on business duration, offering
an estimation approach that can accommodate double censoring and endogenous covariates,
commonly encountered in the analysis of panel duration data.
The firms we consider in our sample compete for public procurement contracts. The size
of the public procurement activity in 2013 reached 13% of the GDP in the United States,
16% in the European Union and 12% across OECD countries, excluding procurement by
state owned utilities.2 Most of these contracts are allocated via simple auction mechanisms.
Theoretical research by Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002) and De Silva, Jeitschko and Kos-
mopoulou (2005) points to the fact that potential learning benefits for the winner create
incentives for competitors to engage in risky behavior leading often to a serious bankruptcy
problem (Leufkens, Peeters and Vermeulen (2010)). Under such competitive pressures, firms
could contract out part of their work to ameliorate uncertainty and share information and
expertise. Subcontracting allows bidders to control future costs by smoothing out work-
load obligations, leading possibly to a reduction in firms’ information rents (Jeriorski and
Krasnokutskaya, 2016). Transaction costs associated with subcontracting can often put sig-
nificant upward pressure on project costs (Miller, 2014). In an effort to explore ramifications
of the trade-off that exists between the uncertainty involved and the resulting profitability,
we focus on firm survival at early stages of a firm’s development, when entrants are likely
to be inexperienced and uncertain about their costs but can take advantage of opportuni-
ties to subcontract out part of their business activity. We distinguish among firms based
on opportunities for work outside road construction and whether they subcontract their
work to Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (or DBEs) in response largely to policy driven
1See for example Gil and Marion (2013), Marion (2015), Moretti and Valbonesi (2015), and Branzoli and
Decarolis (2015).
2The value of procurement activity by state owned utilities in countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) amounts to 2-13% of their GDP.
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participation goals.3
This paper proposes a new quantile regression approach for doubly censored data to
investigate the survival of establishments competing for goverment procurement contracts.
Double censoring, or left-censoring and right-censoring, occurs often in the analysis of pro-
curement data because the age of incumbents is not observed at the time of participation in
auctions and information is limited by the length of the observation window. Lack of access
to historical information about a population of interest is an issue in many longitudinal sur-
veys related to unemployment duration, labor markets outcomes studied through recorded
histories, educational outcomes and schooling durations. It is often a problem in firm market
survival analysis across all industries and expansion through penetration in foreign markets.
While most of the quantile regression literature focuses on the cross-sectional case, we pro-
pose a flexible semiparametric method for a panel duration quantile regression model with
endogenous covariates. For example, Lin, He and Portnoy (2012), and Ji, Peng, Cheng
and Lai (2012) offer semiparametric approaches for double censored data for cross-sectional
models with exogenous covariates.4 Our methodology is built upon the approaches consid-
ered in Ji, Peng, Cheng and Lai (2012), Harding and Lamarche (2012), and Chernozhukov,
Ferna´ndez-Val and Kowalski (2015).
We estimate a panel quantile model for establishments’ survival in the market while
controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity as in Harding and Lamarche (2012). This is
important since subcontracting activities are likely to be endogenous. The quantile approach
is useful in examining the apparent increase in business life of conditionally young firms who
subcontract out part of their active projects. We apply the method to a newly-constructed
data set of establishments that allows an empirical investigation of the survival of plants in
road construction. Our main result indicates that utilizing subcontractors that can share
information and part of the uncertainty can have a positive effect on duration in business, in
3DBEs are defined as small businesses that are owned and controlled by members of a minority group
including women-owned businesses and historically underrepresented businesses. Marion (2009, 2015) and
De Silva, Dunne, Kosmopoulou, and Lamarche (2012) investigate the potential effects of DBE subcontracting
on the cost of procurement contracting.
4Since Powell’s (1986) seminal paper, there has been a growing literature on semiparametric censored
models. For example see, Chen and Khan (2001), Horowitz and Lee (2004), Blundell and Powell (2007),
Khan and Tamer (2007, 2009), Lee (2008), Honore´ and de Paula (2010), among others. The quantile
regression literature includes Portnoy (2003), Peng and Huang (2008), Galvao, Lamarche and Lima (2013)
and a survey by Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006).
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particular at early stages of a firm’s life. The empirical evidence suggests that those effects
seem to be more pronounced for firms with limited business options outside road construction
and those who employ DBE subcontractors. DBE subcontracting is often dictated by policy
aiming to increase representation of underrepresented populations in business. Research has
shown that more often than not these policies increase the cost of procurement (Marion 2009).
Our results suggest that the employment of DBEs as subcontractors prolongs business life at
low conditional quantiles, creating externalities significantly larger than those by non DBE
firms. A possible explanation is that, in Texas, a DBE program appears to have encouraged
the formation of a large number of DBE subcontractors who have gained experience in
specific tasks and therefore can help firms to smooth out constraints of contracting.
These findings offer new evidence on the survival of plants in the road construction
industry which is highly concentrated (see De Silva, Kosmopoulou and Lamarche, 2009).
They also suggested that newly enacted programs similar to Mentor-prote´ge´ programs in
Texas and Connect2DOT in Colorado, which have now been adopted in more than thirty
states and provide firms the opportunity to create a network of subcontractors, can enhance
their survival, particularly among entrants who are vital to the competitiveness of the market,
and firms with limited opportunities outside road construction. The results complement
the empirical studies analyzing the success of entrants in other manufacturing and service
industries, retailing and agriculture (see Seim (2001), Dunne, Jensen and Roberts (2009),
and Helfat and Lieberman (2002) for a review).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical model framing our
statistical analysis. It also presents the quantile regression model and method. Section 3
describes the data, and it offers the main empirical results. Section 3 also examines the
role of business opportunities outside the state procurement contracts on firm’s survival.
Section 4 has concluding remarks. Finally, Appendix A presents evidence on the small
sample performance of the approach.
2 Survival of Plants: Theory and Estimation
The next section considers a dynamic framework that creates a link between government
procurement contracting and the analysis of duration models in the spirit of Honore´ and
4
de Paula (2010). We focus on subcontracting activity which is widespread and has no
institutional limit per contract. Later in Section 2.2, we propose a panel quantile estimator
for the analysis of the survival of plants in the road construction industry which allows us
to investigate the effect of subcontracting on conditionally low durations.
2.1 Modeling Framework
Firm i (or establishment i, as in the empirical application) is in the construction industry
primarily competing for contracts. The competition determines how long it will continue
being active in business by selecting an optimal continuation strategy that leads to an exit
time T . The firm also decides whether to subcontract out part of a project. This is motivated
by the fact that in our data, which is described in Section 3.1, 87.37% of prime contractors
subcontract out a percentage of the contracted tasks and the number of subcontractors in
government procurement projects ranges from 0 to 35. On average, 20.43% of a contract’s
value is subcontracted out.
Consider pi to be the profit function of a firm consisting of the net payoff from contracting
activity, and the payoff from complementary business activity. The profit related to con-
tracting activity, piC , is a function of auction, bidder and rival characteristics x ∈ X ⊂ R
p1,
and the size of firm and involvement in subcontracting activity captured by the vector
s ∈ S ⊂ Rp2. In our econometric specification introduced in section 3, p2 = 2. At any time
t, therefore, the profit function of a representative firm takes the following form
pi(x, s, t) = piC(x, s, t) + A(t), (2.1)
where A(t) represents an outside option assumed later to be A = 0 to distinguish firms
by their dependence on road construction procurement. We also assume that piC(x, s, t) =
V (x, s, t, θ(x, s))− C(x, s, t, f), where V (x, s, t, θ(x, s)) := W (x, s)θ(x, s)φ(t) is the ex post
value of a contract to a firm, W (x, s) is the payoff related in part to auction and bidders
characteristics, and θ(·, ·) is a firm specific productivity index that can enhance the profit
from procurement contracting. We assume φ(t) > 0 for t > 1 and φ(0) = 0. The term
C(x, s, f, t) is a cost function related to bidder characteristics, project characteristics, size
and subcontracting opportunities, a fixed operating cost, f , and t. We let C(x, s, f, t) =
h(x, s, f)ψ(t) where ψ is a function associated with changes in costs through time (ψ(t) > 0
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with ψ(0) = 0). Finally, we assume, for simplicity, the outside option A(t) = Aψ(t).
Assuming an exponential discount rate ρ, we can express the net profit from road con-
struction business until time t as∫ t
0
piC(x, s, z)e
−ρzdz =
∫ t
0
[W (x, s)θ(x, s)φ(z)− h(x, s, f)ψ(z)]e−ρzdz. (2.2)
Then the cumulative profit across activities is
∫ t
0
[W (x, s)θ(x, s)φ(z)− h(x, s, f)ψ(z)]e−ρzdz +
∫ t
0
Aψ(z)e−ρzdz. (2.3)
Conditional on size and subcontracting decisions, optimizing behavior with respect to t
requires that the firm will continue to be in business as long as the benefit of being active
at time t exceeds the cost and the value of the outside option, i.e.,
W (x, s)θ(x, s)φ(T ) = (h(x, s, f)− A)ψ(T ). (2.4)
This first order condition determines the optimal timing T for exit. Conditional on the
optimal timing decision, the firm will choose s to maximize the value of the objective function
subject to the constraint that s depends upon w which is defined as a vector of exogenous
variables that do not affect a firm’s decision to exit and exogenous restrictions related to
the use of disadvantaged business enterprises as subcontractors based on government set
goals. These variables will serve as instruments in our econometric specification and will be
discussed at length in section 3.2 within the context of our empirical application. Specifically
the objective is to
max
s∈S
Π(T (s)) = max
s∈S
{W (x, s)Φ(T (s))θ(x, s)− (h(x, s, f)− A)Υ(T (s)) + λ(s− ζ(w))}
(2.5)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier, ζ(·) is a known smooth function, Φ(T ) =
∫ T
0
φ(z)e−ρzdz,
and Υ(T ) =
∫ T
0
ψ(z)e−ρzdz. We shall consider this more general case in section 3.3, although
in what follows, we concentrate on the case of no outside business opportunities by assuming
A = 0.
Let φ(T )/ψ(T ) = ξ(T ). Under mild conditions, these two optimization problems produce
a system of interdependent equations that can be written as:
T = ξ−1(h(x, s, f)/W (x, s)θ(x, s)) (2.6)
s ≡ argmaxΠ(T (s), ζ(w)). (2.7)
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It follows from equation (2.6) that
ln ξ(T ) = − lnW (x, s)− ln θ(x, s) + ln h(x, s, f). (2.8)
The economic model in (2.8) leads to a simple, yet convenient statistical model that fits
within a class of duration models. For instance, appropriate choices for ξ(T ) and W (x, s)
lead to the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model.5 Following standard practice, we assume
that the ex post value of the contract for a firm is W (x, s) = exp(s′γ + x′β). Moreover,
we assume that issues associated with possible dependence between a firm’s unobserved
heterogeneity and (x, s) can be addressed by controlling for a duration-invariant omitted
variable, α := − ln θ(x, s). Under these assumptions, a version of the model presented in
equation (2.8) can be written as
M(T ) = s′γ + x′β + α + u, (2.9)
where M(·) is a monotone function, in this case the logarithmic function, and u is an error
term distributed as Fu with a conditional variance that depends on x and s. Note that
the error term contains components of the latent cost, and these factors are correlated with
the vector s as in equation (2.7) conditional on individual effects. Lastly, we note that the
variable time to exit the market, T , in equation (2.9) is not fully observed as we observe
only,
Y = max{L,min{T, U}}, (2.10)
where the variable Y represents the standard censored response variable, L denotes left-
censoring time, and U denotes right-censoring time. In our application, L is zero for entrants
and the age of the firm for incumbents and U denotes the time period at which we cease to
observe firm activity whether it has exited or not.
Based on this model, we estimate the following quantile regression function:
QM(T )(τ |x, s, α) = s
′γ(τ) + x′β(τ) + α(τ), (2.11)
where QM(T )(τ |x, s, α) = inf{y : Pr(Y < y|x, s, α) ≥ τ} is the τ -th conditional quantile func-
tion given (s′,x′, α) and τ ∈ (0, 1) is a quantile of the conditional survival times distribution.6
5See Lancaster (1990), Lee (2008) and Honore´ and de Paula (2010).
6The structural parameter, γ(τ), can be interpreted as representing the effect of s on the τ -th conditional
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Quantiles are equivariant to monotone transformations, therefore we can write the previous
model as QM(T )(τ |x, s, α) = M(QT (τ |x, s, α)). Thus, the survival times distribution can be
expressed as QT (τ |x, s, α) = exp{s
′γ(τ) + x′β(τ) + α(τ)}.
It is important to emphasize that we concentrate our attention on a quantile version
of equation (2.6) and, as implied by equation (2.7), some elements of the vector s might
not be exogenous, even if we condition on firm unobserved heterogeneity, α. For instance,
the size of a new establishment, or subcontracting might not be determined independently
of whether the firm stayed in business as suggested by (2.7). To deal with the potential
endogeneity of the independent variables, we adopt the control variable approach proposed
by Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val and Kowalski (2015). It basically adds a variable in the
regression so that conditional on it, regressors are not correlated with the error term of the
model. Their approach works in the spirit of Blundell and Powell (2007), although it allows
for a flexible non-additive first stage specification. The control variable is defined as,
v = ψ0(s,x, α,w) ≡ Fs(s|x, α,w) ≡ Q
−1
s
(s|x, α,w) (2.12)
where ψ0(·) is a control function, w is a vector of instruments, Fs is the conditional distribu-
tion of s, andQs is the conditional quantile function of s. Note that Fs orQs can be estimated
by any parametric or semiparametric method. Therefore, P (T ≤ QT (τ |s,x, α)|v,x, α) is
equal to the quantile τ . This assumption is standard in the quantile regression literature
and is equivalent to require that u(τ) = T −QT (τ |s,x, α) has zero τ -th quantile conditional
on v, x, and α.7
2.2 Estimation
To obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of the effect of subcontracting on the condi-
tional duration distribution, it is clear that we need to address issues associated with double
censoring and endogenous independent variables at the same time. This section proposes
quantile function of the response variable while controlling for heterogeneity, say α. This model can be viewed
as a conditional model. There are other conditional models available in the quantile regression literature and
we refer the reader to Kim and Yang (2011) for additional discussion on marginal and conditional quantile
regression models. Moreover, it is also different than the unconditional quantiles work by Firpo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (2009) and Fro¨lich and Melly (2013).
7It can also be considered s = g(w)+v, where g(w) may be a non-parametric function, and v is an error
term that is not independent from u. Blundell and Powell (2007) approach is similar to the one proposed
by Chen and Khan (2001), which is based on a non-parametric function Λ(v) defined for v ≡ s− g(w).
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a semiparametric estimation approach for the quantile regression model (2.11) that encom-
passes the control variable in (2.12) and double censoring as in (2.10).
Consider, for simplicity, a sample of n firms observed m times.8 As in Harding and
Lamarche (2012), we find the argument that minimizes a quantile regression objective func-
tion with individual effects. In contrast to existing work however, we augment the model by
a control variable.9 Let Xij = (s
′
ij,x
′
ij , z
′
i, vˆ
′
ij)
′ where zi is a vector that indicates firm i, and
Ψ(τk) = (γ(τk)
′, β(τk)
′, α(τk)
′, λ(τk)
′)′. The estimator of the control variable (2.12) is based
on vij = Q
−1
V (sij − g(xij, zi,wij)) where g(·) is a known linear parametric function and the
control variable vij can be estimated by the empirical cumulative distribution function of
the least squares residuals.10 Our estimator for Ψ(τ) is then defined as follows:
Ψˆ(τ) = arg min
Ψ∈Θ
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(log(Yij)−X
′
ijΨ(τ))(ϑij(τ)− δijI(log(Yij)−X
′
ijΨ(τ) < 0)) (2.13)
where δij equals 1 if Lij ≤ Tij ≤ Uij and 0 otherwise and,
ϑij(τ) =
q−1∑
k=0
I(Yij ≥ exp(X
′
ijΨ(τk)) > Lij)(H(τk+1)−H(τk)), (2.14)
The solution of (2.13), Ψˆ(τ), is called the τ -th panel quantile regression estimator for doubly
censored data (PQDC). Naturally, in the case of censored data and exogenous covariates,
one can estimate the model by solving (2.13) while replacing Xij by (s
′
ij ,x
′
ij, z
′
i)
′. We employ
this estimator in Section 3.2 and we compare the results with the results obtained by the
PQDC estimator, Ψˆ(τ).
The standard error of Ψˆ(τ) in the next Section 3 is obtained by the bootstrap procedure
proposed by Jin, Ying and Wei (2001) and investigated in Ma and Kosorok (2005). This
procedure works under fairly general conditions and can accommodate within block corre-
8The estimation approach proposed in this section can be naturally applied to different datasets including
balanced and unbalanced panels. In Section 3.2, we estimate the quantile model using m firms with nj
establishments. The implication is that the number of establishments of firm j can be different than the
number of establishments of firm k.
9When Lij = 0 for all (i, j) and instruments are used instead of control variables, our proposed estimator
is identical to Harding and Lamarche’s (2012) estimator. While an instrumental variable approach to panel
duration quantile models with a large number of firms may be regarded by applied researchers as compu-
tationally demanding, the approach proposed in this paper solves a relatively simpler linear programming
problem that performs extremely well in large size applications.
10See Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val and Kowalski (2015) for alternative specifications and estimators.
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lation.11 Because it maintains the endogenous structure of the model, it can be extended
to include the use of a control function to address the potential endogeneity of size and
subcontracting activities.
3 Survival of firms in the construction industry
In this section, we use a sample of entrants and incumbents to study how procurement auc-
tions shape the survival of firms in the road construction industry. We first perform, in
Appendix A, a brief simulation study to investigate the performance of the proposed esti-
mator. We then employ the estimation procedure developed in this paper and report the
results in Section 3.2. Finally, we perform a series of robustness checks, considering alterna-
tive samples and approaches. Our main results highlight the impact that subcontracting out
can have on duration in business. The proposed approach which has excellent finite sample
properties as shown in Appendix A is useful in uncovering the increase in the conditional
business life of young entrants who engage in subcontracting.
3.1 A Description of the data
Our firm-level data were obtained from two sources: the Texas Department of Transportation
(TxDOT) and the Texas Workforce Commission. The data that contain information on
bidding activity for highway construction contracts were obtained from TxDOT. They span
the period between July 1999 and December 2006. All projects are auctioned off using a first-
price sealed-bid format. The data set contains information on project types, the engineer’s
cost estimate for each project, the number of bidders that requested plans, the number of
bids submitted per project, the winning bidders, and the winning bids. It also contains the
location and complexity of each project and the number of days until its completion. A
detailed description of the initial information that was collected and the variables that were
subsequently constructed are in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The data set also provides the
names of subcontractors for the winning bidders and corresponding negotiated subcontractor
11Jin, Ying and Wei (2001) and Ma and Kosorok (2005) suggest drawing independent variables from a
non-negative distribution with mean 1 and variance 1 (i.e., exponential or Gamma distribution) to perturb
the objective function. In our application, we obtain Ψ∗ as the argument that minimizes a perturbed (2.13).
We reiterate this procedure B times to obtain a large sample of realizations {Ψ∗b}
B
b=1. For a given quantile,
we can obtain the variance of Ψˆ(τ) by the sample variance of {Ψ∗b}
B
b=1.
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Variable All firms Incumbents Entrants
Number of firms that held plans 993 629 364
Number of establishments (branches) 1275 751 524
Total number of bids 6,998 5,727 1,271
[7.05] [9.10] [3.49]
Total number of wins 1,668 1,375 293
[1.68] [2.19] [0.80]
Number of firms that submit at least a bid 540 394 146
[0.54] [0.63] [0.40]
Number of firms that at least won once 341 267 74
[0.34] [0.42] [0.20]
Relative bid 1.077 1.079 1.069
(0.249) (0.247) (0.259)
Relative winning bid 0.970 0.974 0.946
(0.177) (0.176) (0.181)
Number of employees 75.935 70.110 92.567
(247.727) (198.236) (265.410)
Number of months in the market 51.579 64.855 32.553
(35.577) (34.383) (27.788)
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the TXDOT-QCEW data. The sample includes existing
firms (Incumbents) and new firms that entered the market in the period July 1999-December
2006 (Entrants). Relative Bid is defined as bid divided by the engineer’s cost estimate and
Relative winning bid as winning bid divided by the engineer’s cost estimate. Statistics scaled
by the number of firms are shown in brackets and standard deviations are in parentheses.
dollar values. This allows us to identify primary bidders who have initially participated as
subcontractors in TxDOT auctions.
Establishment-level monthly employment and quarterly wage data for Texas establish-
ments were obtained from the Texas Workforce Commission’s Quarterly Census of Employ-
ment and Wages (QCEW) data base. This data base, as required under the Texas unem-
ployment insurance (UI) program, provides establishment-specific monthly employment and
quarterly total wages. It also includes each firm’s business start-up date, the specific loca-
tion of the establishment, and the six-digit North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) code. Separate establishments (branches or plants) of the same firm are identified
and reported in separate records. This allows us to identify firm level expansions or con-
tractions (increase or decrease in number of branches and employment). These permanent
11
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Figure 1: Frequencies for the number of entrants and exitors. The x-axis on the left panel
considers the year of entry for entrants after July 1999. The x-axis on the right panel
considers the year of exit for firms that entered the market after July 1st, 1999. The shaded
areas denote firms’ activities related to the procurement auctions.
or temporary expansions (contractions) could be due to the natural rate of firm growth (de-
clines) or to absorption of a temporary shock due to winning (completion of) a long term
project in a distant location from the main office. The appearance of a new Employer Iden-
tification Number (EIN) and firm start-up date signifies entry and disappearance of an EIN
record signifies exit. This is similar to the definition used by Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) and
Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988)).12 In a similar way, we also use the establishment
start date and employment patterns to identify entry and exit. However, our data suggest
that bids are generated from the main office and not from branches.
Table 1 reports information on all firms that held plans (plan holders) during this pe-
riod.13 A unique characteristic of this market is that there are a large number of plan
12The data allows us to identify changes in the names of firms. Those changes should not be counted as
exit (Dunne et al. 1988). Moreover, we can identify horizontal mergers.
13Any contractor considering to bid on a project must request a plan from the state. The list of plan
holders defines the potential competitors in an auction. The plan holder list is public information and
becomes available to all bidders.
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Figure 2: Frequencies for the number of subcontractors in active projects. The left panels
presents the number of subcontractors and the right panels the number of Disadvantaged
Business Enterprises (or DBEs) Subcontractors.
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holders that are capable of intensifying competitive pressures intermittently through the
bidding process. There are 993 different plan holders and 540 bidders in this data set. Table
1 also provides information on relative bids and relative winning bids which are bids that
are normalized by their engineering cost estimates. The average relative bid is 1.077 and the
average relative winning bid is 0.970. These incumbent firms had about 70 employees per
branch and on average, survived about 64 month. Column 3 reports the summary statistics
for entrants. Entrants are bidding lower and are winning with more aggressive bids. We
observe that there are 364 entrants and 74 of them are contractors in the period of analysis.
They stay in the market for about half of the life of incumbents.
The sample of entrants include 214 plan holders and 41 firms (with potentially many
branches) that won a project at least once in their early stages. Using this sample of
entrants, Figure 1 shows the empirical distributions of firms’ entry and exit. Note that these
estimates do not suffer from biases arising from left-censoring. The first panel presents the
number of plan holders that enter the market. Approximately 41 percent of firms became
bidders and 20 percent became winners in the period of analysis. We see that the number
of firms entering the market increased in the period 1999-2001, and had a decreasing trend
after 2001. Nevertheless, the year of entry does not seem to be a critical determinant of the
probability of winning. While 20 percent became contractors in the period 1999-2001, 19
percent became contractors in the period after. The second panel presents the number of
plan holders that exited the market in the same period of analysis. The evidence indicates
that no firm that entered the market in either 1999 or 2000 exited the market in those years.
As illustrated in Figure 2, there are high- and low-subcontracting establishments and the
number of subcontractors in active projects depends on the number of branches per firm. The
total number of subcontractors ranges from 0 to 35, with a mean of 1.86 subcontractors in
active projects.14 To make Figure 2 clearer, we limit the number of subcontractors in active
projects to 14. The panels also shows that high-subcontractor establishments are typically
part of a firm with multiple establishments. When we focus on Disadvantaged Business
Enterprises, the number of DBE subcontractors is naturally smaller. Nevertheless, 2555
14We observe subcontractor information when a firm wins. Any subcontractor responsible for working on
the project has to be identified and listed with the Texas Department of Transportation. Unfortunately we
do not see subcontractors subcontracting. From what we know when a winner subcontracts, that portion
has to be completed by the subcontractors that are listed.
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Figure 3: Profile of contractors’ relative size. The y-axis shows the logarithm of employment
relative to initial employment and the x-axis the number of months from establishment in
business. The letters cs and c indicate events in the firms’ life related to the procurement
auctions: cs denotes first time contractor who subcontract out part of the project, and c
indicates first win as primary contractor who does not subcontract out part of the project.
The letters a indicates asphalt, b denotes bridge, and e denotes exit time.
projects have some DBE goals. Such goals are set on federal projects only. The average DBE
goal is 3.40 of the contracted value across all federal projects and 6.31 across all projects with
actual DBE goals. It is interesting to see that more than 90 percent of single-establishment
firms, which are typically entrant firms, do not use DBE subcontracting.
A graph on business activity of individual contractors can provide intuition about the
role of procurement auctions on firm survival. Figure 3 considers four contractors and offers
a cursory look at employment patterns as a function of time. These firms were selected
for their value in emphasizing activities and survival paths that later prove to be quite
representative. The panel to the left illustrates the role of subcontracting on duration in
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business. The longitudinal dimension of the data tentatively ascribes the apparent influence
of subcontracting out part of the first contract on business duration. Although the firms won
their first projects at a similar age, only the company that subcontracted part of its project
(indicated by the letters cs) seems to have grown over time. The right panel in Figure 3
focuses on relative risks associated with involvement in different type of projects. As seen
on the graph, the contractor who did asphalt work had a steady employment growth despite
the fact that contracting activity for TxDOT started only after the first four and a half
years in business. The size of the entrant in bridge work increased until the first project was
won (indicated by the letter b). Immediately after that, the size of the company decreased
leading eventually to market exit (denoted by e). For this firm survival in business may have
been associated with uncertainty induced by the projects undertaken and lack of outside
business options that can affect the timing of the first win.
3.2 Main Empirical Results
We begin estimating a model for survival times using standard approaches. The results are
shown in Table 2. The dependent variable is duration in the market for an establishment
and the main independent variables are average number of employees (size) of the plant
during the duration of the spell, a binary variable indicating whether the establishment is an
entrant, the cost index of active projects, and the average number of subcontractors that a
firm seeks out. In all the models estimated in this section, we include capacity utilization and
backlog variables. The cost index is based on a composite indicator that covers the unit costs
of excavation, resurfacing and construction. It mainly reflects exogenous cost changes for
materials needed to complete highway projects. The table shows quantile regression results,
the fixed effects quantile regression estimator as in Koenker (2004), and quantile regression
results for a model with censored data as in Peng and Huang (2008). We also show results
obtained by Powell’s (1984) CLAD estimator which is designed to address right censoring in
a cross-sectional model with exogenous variables. For completeness, the table shows classical
OLS and fixed effects results. The interested reader can find additional details on how the
variables were constructed in Appendix B.
One might argue about the validity of the results presented in Table 2. Several issues
are worth mentioning: (i) the dependent variable is left-censored for incumbents since we
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Variables Quantiles Mean
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Pooled Quantile Regression OLS
Size -0.766 -0.619 -0.173 0.000 0.000 -0.486
(0.044) (0.039) (0.035) (0.009) (0.004) (0.022)
Entrant -0.540 -0.773 -0.769 -0.341 -0.174 -0.699
(0.161) (0.140) (0.127) (0.032) (0.014) (0.079)
Cost Index -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 -0.029 -0.028 -0.026
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Subcontracting -0.024 -0.108 -0.075 -0.015 0.000 -0.034
(0.030) (0.026) (0.024) (0.006) (0.003) (0.015)
Panel Quantile Regression FE
Size 0.083 0.070 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.076
(0.043) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022)
Entrant -0.791 -0.542 -0.607 -0.271 -0.129 -0.348
(0.115) (0.047) (0.053) (0.074) (0.053) (0.194)
Cost Index -0.017 -0.020 -0.018 -0.022 -0.027 -0.018
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Subcontracting 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.022
(0.023) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013)
Censored Quantile Regression CLAD
Size 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.073
(0.597) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Entrant -0.523 -0.459 -0.261 -0.170 -0.069 -0.790
(0.016) (0.003) (0.029) (0.032) (0.014) (0.017)
Cost Index -0.040 -0.054 -0.072 -0.072 -0.087 -0.025
(0.003) (0.012) (0.038) (0.036) (0.014) (0.001)
Subcontracting -0.092 -0.514 -0.370 -0.082 -0.018 -0.103
(0.104) (0.566) (0.164) (0.109) (0.000) (0.006)
Table 2: Quantile regression results for the sample of plans. Pooled Quantile Regression
refers to classical quantile regression applied to pooled data, Panel Quantile Regression de-
notes Koenker (2004) estimator and Censored Quantile Regression refers to Peng and Huang
(2008) estimator. Moreover, OLS denotes Ordinary Least Squares, FE denotes classical fixed
effects estimator, and CLAD is the Censored Least Absolute Deviation estimator. The stan-
dard errors are obtained after 1000 panel bootstrap repetitions.
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do not have information on whether or not the plant or firm participated in an auction
before the window of observation; (ii) the dependent variable is likely to be right-censored
for entrants and incumbents; (iii) following our framework in Section 2, the variables size and
subcontracting are likely to be endogenous because duration in the market affects size and
subcontracting experience of the firm and size or subcontracting are likely to affect duration;
(iv) the independent variables are likely to be correlated with firm latent heterogeneity. None
of the methods employed in Table 2 jointly address these potential issues. It is immediately
apparent that these estimation issues are present in the results associated with size and
subcontracting. In the censored regressions, subcontracting, if anything, has a negative
effect on duration in the market. We also find that size has no effect on survival which
contradicts the existing literature. As we see below, these findings change dramatically
when we address the estimation challenges.
We therefore turn to the estimation of a panel duration model with double censored
data and endogenous covariates. We estimate Tij = exp{s
′
ijγ + x
′
ijβ + αj + uij}, where
Tij denotes the duration in the market in months of plant i associated with firm j. Note
that Tij is latent and we use the observed duration Yij. The variable Lij is equal to zero
for entrants and it is equal to the age of the initial establishment for incumbents. Left
censoring occurs for incumbents because we do not observe entry of a branch before 1999.
The variable αj captures effects that are common to establishments within firms.
15 In this
model, it seems natural to consider that the size of an establishment s1,ij, measured by the
logarithm of average employment, and subcontracting s2,ij , measured by the average number
of subcontractors in active projects, are endogenous.
To address the potential endogeneity of these variables, we generate a control variable
using least squares residuals. Specifically, we obtain vˆk,ij = Φ
−1(sk,ij−R
′
k,ijpˆi) where Rk,ij =
(wk,ij,x
′
ij, z
′
i)
′, xij is a vector of exogenous variables that includes an indicator variable
for whether the establishment is an entrant, a composite variable that cover unit costs of
15Consistent estimation of the quantile function corresponding to equation (2.9) requires to incorporate
firm specific controls for productivity that enhance the profit from procurement contracting. These effects
include firm specific information and procurement experience that can be shared within a firm that is likely
to affect success of establishments in the market. Notice however that the panel is unbalanced as there
is a large number of single-establishment firms (Table 1). To avoid issues associated with singular design
matrices, we estimate a model with an overall intercept and individual effects for firms who might share
information and procurement experience (i.e., firms with more than one establishment). See Appendix A
for an investigation of the performance of the estimator when the panel is unbalanced.
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different tasks, capacity utilization and backlog variables, zi is a vector of indicator variables
for the individual effects, k ∈ {0, 1} and Φ(·) is the Normal cumulative distribution function.
The “excluded” exogenous variables wij includes the annual change in the number of single
family units approved by building permits prior to the firm’s year of birth and the number of
plan holders in active projects. The number of single family units by building permits before
a plant enters the market should be naturally correlated with the number of subcontractors.
On the other hand, pre-determined changes in home renovations including electrical work
and plumbing should be independent of project costs of a plant that participates in the
procurement auctions years later. Moreover, the number of plan holders is uncorrelated
with latent time-varying drivers of survival in the market as the number of plan holders in
an auction identifies the maximum number of bidders that expressed interest in the project
and may submit bids. With respect to the correlation between number of plan holders and
size, we argue that the number of plans held by a firm determines the likelihood of winning
and eventually the number of employees needed to complete the project. The number of
plan holders has been used in the empirical auction literature (De Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge
and Kosmopoulou 2008). The other independent variables are considered to be exogenous
variables conditioning on αj . As in Section 2.2, the estimator is obtained in a second step
using the control variable vˆij .
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The results are presented in Figure 4. The figure presents estimates of the main covariate
effects as a function of the quantile τ of the conditional distribution of duration. In each
graph, the continuous line shows the point estimates and the shaded region represents a
90% confidence interval for the point estimates. For instance, the first graph on the top row
shows estimates of the effect of size on duration. The estimate is positive and significant
at the 0.25 quantile and it tends to decrease as we go across quantiles. The advantage of
the figure is that it allows us to carefully examine the effect of the independent variables of
interest at any quantile. As expected, the size of the plant is likely to affect the duration in
the market which was not implied by the results presented in Table 2. The main results sug-
gest that duration in construction business is affected by the procurement auctions through
subcontracting and changes in the input prices of active projects. (The sole exception is
the effect of subcontracting at the upper tail of the conditional distribution). Having a net-
16We examine the robustness of our results to alternative excluded exogenous variables in Appendix C.
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Figure 4: Quantile regression results for the main covariate effects on duration. The quantiles
of the conditional duration distribution are denoted by τ . The continuous dotted lines show
estimates obtained from the PQRC estimator proposed in this paper. The shaded regions
represent a 90 percent point-wise confidence interval.
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Figure 5: Quantile regression results for the effect of size and subcontracting on duration.
The quantiles of the conditional duration distribution are denoted by τ . The continuous
dotted lines show estimates obtained from the PQRC estimator proposed in this paper. The
shaded regions represent a 90 percent point-wise confidence interval.
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work of subcontractors that can share information and project risks increases the duration
in business.
We implemented Wald-type tests to evaluate whether the effects of size and subcontract-
ing are different across quantiles. We evaluated whether the effects of interest are significantly
different between two quantiles, say τ1 and τj for j ∈ {2, 3, ...M}. The results indicate that
the effect of size is significantly different between the 0.25 and 0.75 quantiles and the effect
of subcontracting is significantly different between the 0.25 and 0.65 quantiles. In the case
of subcontracting, the null hypothesis γ2(0.25) = γ2(0.65) is weakly rejected at 10%. More-
over, to examine the effect of ignoring endogeneity in panel duration models, we offer results
obtained by the same procedure while assuming that size and subcontracting are exogenous.
As explained in Section 2, the estimation procedure is similar but we do not augment the
design matrix with the control variables. As in the case of endogenous variables, the (dashed)
line shows the point estimates.17 The new results suggest that the effect of size is under-
estimated at the low conditional quantiles of the duration distribution if we assume that
size and subcontracting are exogenous. Moreover, the effect of subcontracting is attenuated
towards zero. These results might be interpreted within the framework developed in Section
2.1, which implies that there are latent components of cost not adequately controlled for by
other covariates in the τ -th conditional quantile model. Because higher costs are likely to
negatively affect duration, the comparison between point estimates in Figure 4 suggest that
firm cost is increasing in size and number of subcontractors, as one might have expected.18
Figure 5 shows results from estimating the model as in Figure 4 with the exception
that subcontracting s2,ij is now measured by the average number of Disadvantaged Business
Enterprises (DBEs) in active projects. To address the potential endogeneity of the DBE
subcontracting variable, we generate the control variables using least squares residuals and
17Because they to not represent the main findings and to simplify the visual analysis of the results,
we do not provide a 90% point-wise confidence interval in Figure 4 for the case of exogenous size and
subcontracting. Size remain to be significant at τ ≤ 0.7 but subcontracting is in general insignificant at 10%
(the sole exceptions are the estimates around the median conditional quantile).
18The effect of higher costs on size is not immediately apparent and the sign might not be determined. On
the one hand, it is natural to expect that higher costs negatively affect the average size of an establishment.
On the other hand, higher costs over time are likely to be driven by complex and large projects undertaken
by an establishment. At the same time, the number of employees is likely to increase if the firm wins projects.
Therefore, higher procurement costs can also correlate positively with size. The evidence suggest that this
second channel is more important, although the differences between estimates in Figure 4 are, in general,
not significantly different across quantiles.
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Figure 6: Quantile regression results for the effect of the number of subcontractors on dura-
tion. The shaded regions represent a 90 percent point-wise confidence interval.
the same instruments used to obtain the results shown in Figure 4. The excluded exogenous
variables are the change in the number of single family units approved by building permits
prior to the firm’s year of birth and the number of plan holders in active projects, which not
likely to affect duration conditional on firm heterogeneity.19
The findings suggest that when contractors employ as subcontractors minority and women
owned businesses, known as DBEs, the effects on survival are more pronounced. Addition-
ally, we find that the effect of DBE subcontracting appears to be larger among firms using
4 or more DBE subcontractors in the period of analysis (Figure 6). Contrary to what one
would expect, as DBE subcontracting is often linked to government imposed goals that can
lead to inefficiencies (see Marion 2009), Figure 5 suggests that if a relatively young firm has
utilized DBE subcontractors it is likely to survive longer in business. Although the shape of
19As a reviewer suggested, an alternative identification strategy for the effect of DBE subcontracting can
be based upon the timing of implementation of programs across states.
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the subcontracting effects is similar to the results shown in Figure 4, the estimated effects
are roughly two times larger at several quantiles including τ = 0.25.20 Even though there
is a large number of minority-owned construction firms in Texas and the program that en-
couraged the formation and success of DBEs has increased the supply of those firms without
increasing the cost to the state (see De Silva, Dunne, Kosmopoulou and Lamarche 2012),
the results go a step further to suggest that DBE subcontracting may have positive external
effects on competitors.
Subcontracting allows establishments to smooth out constraints in contracting and there-
fore benefits an establishment if other firms have extensive experience in specific tasks. DBE
subcontractors will likely fit this profile because the program in Texas appears to have
encouraged the formation of minority and women owned businesses who often undertake
subcontracting work either within or outside the federally imposed DBE subcontracting
goals.21
There is a long debate on the value of policies targeting small or disadvantaged businesses
with evidence provided on costs and benefits (see Marion (2009, 2015) and De Silva, Dunne,
Kosmopoulou, and Lamarche (2012) for some related findings). Nakabayashi (2013) considers
in a counterfactual estimation the impact on firm exit, of eliminating incentives targeting
small businesses in Japan. He finds that elimination of such programs would induce exit of
40% of existing small business firms. That reduction in competition would increase the cost
of procurement.
3.3 Empirical Evidence from a Sample of Entrants
This section considers a series of robustness checks on the specifications and assumptions
behind the models estimated in the previous section. The results are shown in Table 3.
20We accommodated existing Wald-type tests to evaluate whether the effects of size and subcontracting
in Figure 5 are significantly different across quantiles. The results indicated that the effect of size is not
significantly different at 5 percent significance level across quantiles with the exception when we tested the
null hypothesis γ1(0.25) = γ1(0.75). The test had a p-value equal to 0.032. Moreover, the effect of DBE
subcontracting does not significantly change across quantiles. However, as it can be seen in Figure 5, the
effect of DBE subcontracting is statistically significantly different from zero (the exceptions are the lower
and upper quantiles of the conditional duration distribution).
21Information from the Census Bureau’s 2002 Survey of Business Owners indicates that there is a relatively
large number of minority-owned construction firms in Texas in comparison to other states. This is associated,
in part, with the large minority population residing in the state.
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Sample Effect of subcontracting in active projects
Quantiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Entrants 0.715 0.696 0.290 0.148 0.104
(0.314) (0.236) (0.171) (0.062) (0.039)
Entrant firms (cohorts 2000 and 2001) 0.283 0.535 0.529 0.167 0.125
(0.354) (0.431) (0.280) (0.136) (0.036)
Contractors (cohorts 2000 and 2001) 0.974 0.929 0.626 0.172 0.137
(0.449) (0.340) (0.298) (0.189) (0.061)
Entrants firms with outside options 0.584 0.462 0.265 0.161 0.109
(0.376) (0.277) (0.233) (0.088) (0.055)
Entrants firms without outside options 0.856 0.806 0.223 0.071 0.029
(0.321) (0.283) (0.193) (0.107) (0.069)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control function Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 3: Panel duration quantile regression results for the logarithm of survival times. Con-
trol variables include size, unemployment and cost index of active projects. Project specific
controls include the value of the engineer’s cost estimate of the project, the total number of
bid items in a project, and indicators for projects grouped into asphalt and bridge categories.
The control variable function is based on the number of plan holders in active projects, a
lagged value of the number of plan holders, a lagged value of logarithm of employment and
lagged values of number of firms in single-family and multifamily housing construction. The
standard errors are obtained after 1000 panel bootstrap repetitions.
These results are obtained by restricting the sample of firms to include entrants and defining
the dependent variable as Tij , where i denotes establishments and j indicates age of the es-
tablishment in months. A survival model for Tij can be estimated by the proposed approach,
provided that the data is organized following a m-line record.22 In what follows, we discuss
the importance of subcontracting among entrants, business cycle effects and the effect of
work outside the procurement auctions on firms’ duration in business.
22It refers to the idea that we can split the observed duration data into segments. During m− 1 periods,
the covariates are time-varying and the censoring variable is equal to 1 because the firm is observed. The last
segment includes the final observed duration, covariates and a censoring variable equal to 0. The interested
reader can find additional details on page 598 of Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
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3.3.1 Subcontracting and Survival of Entrants
Following the framework adopted in section 2, as before, we assume that the size of a
firm, measured by the logarithm of total employment, and subcontracting are endogenous
variables. However the difference with respect to our previous results is that we concentrate
on the effects of subcontracting using a sample of entrants. To obtain the control variable
function, we include in w the number of plan holders in active projects, a lagged value
of the number of plan holders, a lagged value of the logarithm of employment and lagged
values of number of firms in single-family and multi-family housing construction. In addition
to the controls used in the previous section, the model includes project specific covariates
and individual effects, which could be associated to firm specific productivity or level of
involvement in complementary activity that can affect business profit. Notice that these
latent factors may be expected to be correlated with size and subcontracting. Project specific
controls include the value of the engineer’s cost estimate of the project, the total number of
project components in a project, and indicators for projects grouped into the asphalt and
bridge categories. The first row of the table shows that the effect of subcontracting in active
projects is positive and significant at the lowest quantiles, suggesting that subcontracting
prolongs (conditional) duration in business. Subcontracting allows one to share valuable
information to reduce uncertainty and risks, and seems to be more important at early stages
of a firm’s life.
3.3.2 Business cycle effects
Price fluctuations related to the business cycle may affect entry in the procurement auctions.
One would think that high oil prices in the 2000’s may have led to entry of relatively highly-
efficient firms. Or alternatively, funds on infrastructure projects to stimulate the economy
simultaneously affected the type of firms buying plans and bidding.23 In order to isolate the
effect of business cycle movements on duration in business, we restrict our sample to include
(a) entrants who bought a plan in 2000 and 2001 but did not necessarily win a contract, and
23A significant portion of the funds on infrastructure projects in US was devoted to restore and rebuild
bridges. The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Official (AASHTO) 2008 report,
entitled “Bridging the Gap: Restoring and Rebuilding the Nation’s Bridges”, stated that of the 600,000 U.S.
bridges, nearly 152,000 need significant repair. “Almost one in four bridges, while safe to travel, is either
structurally deficient, or in need of repair.”
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(b) firms who did road construction (surfacing/resurfacing) work. Considering these samples,
we re-estimate the models and present the results in Table 3. The evidence is consistent
with the theory and the previous results. It continues to suggest that subcontracting affects
survival of contractors in the road construction industry.
3.3.3 Limited business opportunities outside road construction
The potential losses associated with uncertainty and project risks may be mitigated by
the existence of alternative business options. In light of the framework in Section 2 and
theoretical and experimental evidence in Kirchkamp, Poen, and Reiß (2009), it is of interest
to revisit our findings and distinguish among firms by their dependence on road construction
procurement, and consequently, their access to outside business options.24
After discussions with state highway and civil engineers and based on the original NAICS
classification and additional information obtained from descriptions of their activities, we
created two relevant groups, and accordingly, in Table 3, we divided the sample of contractors
into two sub-samples: firms with outside options (e.g., landscaping, plumbing, heating,
etc.) and firms with few or no outside options (e.g., bridge construction, highway and
street construction, etc.).25,26 Notice that the first group includes firms whose survival in the
industry does not crucially depend upon the outcome of the procurement auction process for
road construction, and the second group include firms whose survival mainly depends upon
these contracts.
The evidence in Table 3 for firms whose survival does not depend on the procured gov-
ernment projects suggests a positive but insignificant effect of subcontracting at the lowest
quantiles of the survival distribution. While the estimated effect of subcontracting is insignif-
icant at the 0.1 quantile among firms with outside options, it is positive and significant for
24Kirchkamp, Poen, and Reiß (2009) studied the effect of the presence of outside options in bidding. They
showed that, bidders respond to outside options by softening bidding aggressiveness.
25The North American industry classification system (NAICS) allows us to distinguish among commercial
and institutional building contractors, electrical contractors, highway, street and bridge contractors, firms
offering landscaping services, new single-family housing contractors, and other building finishing contractors.
26Although it is in principle plausible to classify firms by activities using the NAICS code, its level of
aggregation is an obvious limitation. Consider for instance, firms that were reported to provide services in
the highway, street, and bridge construction industry. This category includes a contractor offering services
in bridge construction as well as a contractor offering plumbing services. While firms in bridge construction
may have limited options outside procurement contracting, firms offering plumbing services have other
opportunities in business.
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firms with few or no outside options. We interpret this result as suggesting that subcontract-
ing can have a more advantageous effect on survival for firms with few or no outside options
(e.g., bridge contractors). It should be noted however that these effects do not appear to be
significantly different at standard levels of significance.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates how subcontracting parts of contracted work affects firm’s survival.
We apply a panel duration quantile regression approach to a sample of data from firms in road
construction. This industry displays market concentration featuring only a small number of
firms, thus limiting the competitiveness of market outcomes. We construct a unique data
set of entrants and propose a semi-parametric approach that simultaneously addresses issues
associated with firm’s latent heterogeneity, endogenous time-varying covariates and double
censored data. The approach offered in this paper appears to perform well relative to other
approaches being studied in the literature of quantile regression for duration data. Our
quantile regression approach allows us to investigate survival beyond the mean effect, which
is important in the context of understanding the determinants of young firms’ duration in
business and the effect of DBE policies on firm survival.
Our results indicate that employing subcontractors can have a positive effect on duration
in business, in particular at early stages of a firm’s life. Those effects are more distinct for
firms with limited business options outside road construction and those who employ DBE
firms as subcontractors. The results also suggest that programs similar to Mentor-prote´ge´
in Texas and Connect2DOT in Colorado, which provide firms the opportunity to create a
network of subcontractors, can enhance their survival.
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A Appendix A: Simulation Study
In this section, we briefly report results from several simulation experiments designed to
evaluate the performance of the estimator defined in equation (2.13). We generate the
dependent variable considering a design similar to Harding and Lamarche (2012):
Tij = 5 + sij + xij + αi + uij, (A.1)
sij = wij + vij , (A.2)
αi = pis¯i + εi. (A.3)
where the instrument is wij = 0.25ηi+eij and the observed independent variable is generated
as Yij = max{Lij ,min{Tij, Uij}}. As before Lij and Uij indicates censoring times and s¯i =
m−1
∑
j=1 sij is the individual specific sample mean of the endogenous variable sij. The
error terms in equations (A.1) and (A.2) are (uij, vij) ∼ N(0,Ω), where Ω11 = Ω22 = 1. The
random variable εi is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 0.5, and the variables
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(eij , xij , ηi) are Gaussian independent random variables. Throughout the simulations, we
adopt a fixed censoring scheme by setting Lij = 1 and Uij = 7.5. We consider four basic
variations of the model:
Design 1: The endogenous variable sij is not correlated with αi, and the variables (uij, vij)
in equations (A.1) and (A.2) are independent Gaussian variables. We assume pi =
Ω21 = Ω12 = 0.
Design 2: We continue to assume that sij is not correlated with αi, but now (uij, vij) are
not independent random variables. We consider Ω12 = Ω21 = −0.5.
Design 3: We consider the case that (uij, vij) are independent Gaussian variables and sij
is correlated with αi by assuming that pi = −0.5 in equation (A.3).
Design 4: The variables (uij, vij) are not independent random variables and sij is correlated
with αi. We assume pi = Ω12 = Ω21 = −0.5.
Design 5: The data is generated as in Design 4. However, we generate data from an un-
balanced panel data model where 70% of the cross-sectional units are observed once
(mi = 1) and the other 30% are observed multiple times.
Table A.1 shows results from several quantile regression estimators: (i) a naive quantile
regression approach that uses the censored variable Y (QR), (ii) a fixed effects approach
(FEQR) that while addressing issues of dependence between αi and xij ignores censoring, (iii)
an instrumental variable method (IVQR), (iv) the survival approach for a censored quantile
regression model (PH) proposed by Peng and Huang (2008), and (v) the quantile regression
estimator proposed in this paper (PQDC). As in Section 2.2, the estimator is obtained in
two steps. In the first step, we generate the control variable using the least squares residuals
obtained from a parametric regression of the endogenous variable sij on the instrument wij.
The table presents the bias of the estimators and their root mean square error (RMSE) for
the slope β1 = 1 in equation (A.1) at two quantiles τ = {0.25, 0.50}, considering n = 50 and
m = 15. The average number of time series observations m¯ = n−1
∑n
i=1mi = 5. Tables A.2
and A.3 show additional results for n = 20 and m = 50.
It is important to note that the three procedures (QR, FEQR, IVQR) being compared
are not designed to address issues with censored data and QR and IVQR are cross-sectional
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methods. Moreover, one procedure (PH) addresses top or bottom censored data but not both
at the same time and ignores the potential correlation between (αi, uij) and sij. However,
the procedures being compared with the proposed approach are the feasible alternatives for
practitioners planning to study the survival of firms in the road construction industry.
We begin comparing the different estimators in the absence of endogeneity or correlated
individual effects (upper panels, Table A.1). Note, however, that the dependent variable
Yij is censored at the left and right tails. We find that our estimator offers a substantial
improvement relative to the competing methods including the Peng-Huang estimator. As we
introduce endogeneity in Designs 2 to 4, by allowing for correlated individual effects and/or
correlation between the independent variable of interest and the error term in equation
(A.1), the performance of our estimator continues to be satisfactory. Under Design 4, the
performance of the PH estimator seems satisfactory as well in the sense that QR, FEQR and
IVQR have substantially larger bias than the PH estimator at the 0.25 quantile. It should be
noted however that the bias of the PH estimator is larger than that of the PQDC estimator.
In terms of RMSE, the PQDC estimator offers the best small sample performance in these
simulations, although the PH estimator shows smaller variance than the PQDC estimator.
This is to be expected since the PQDC estimator includes a control variable, and, more
importantly, n individual effects.
Lastly, Table A.1 shows results obtained using an unbalanced panel. Design 5 is motivated
by the panel dataset used in the empirical application, which includes 72% of firms that are
single establishments. The average number of establishments is 3 and the maximum number
is 15. As expected in the case of unbalanced panels, the performance of the estimator
deteriorates relative to the case with m¯ = m = 15 or m¯ = m = 50. However, the estimator
continues to exhibit low bias and it offers the best performance in the class of estimators for
duration models in quantile regression. Note that the bias of the proposed PQDC estimator
ranges between 2.3% and 8.5%, while the bias of the other competing methods range between
20% and 45%.
Overall, the simulations suggest that our proposed panel quantile estimator performs
well under fixed censoring and is preferred over existing methods when there is interest to
address issues of endogeneity and correlated individual effects.
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τ n m m¯ sij 6⊥: Quantile Estimators
uij αi QR FEQR IVQR PH PQDC
Design 1
Bias 0.25 50 15 15 No No -0.117 -0.124 -0.121 -0.101 -0.005
RMSE 0.25 50 15 15 No No 0.122 0.128 0.132 0.113 0.056
Bias 0.50 50 15 15 No No -0.112 -0.119 -0.111 -0.091 -0.004
RMSE 0.50 50 15 15 No No 0.118 0.124 0.124 0.102 0.058
Design 2
Bias 0.25 50 15 15 Yes No -0.292 -0.303 -0.082 -0.067 0.009
RMSE 0.25 50 15 15 Yes No 0.294 0.304 0.095 0.083 0.058
Bias 0.50 50 15 15 Yes No -0.290 -0.308 -0.075 -0.287 0.006
RMSE 0.50 50 15 15 Yes No 0.292 0.309 0.092 0.290 0.047
Design 3
Bias 0.25 50 15 15 No Yes -0.174 -0.121 -0.202 -0.095 -0.004
RMSE 0.25 50 15 15 No Yes 0.178 0.124 0.210 0.108 0.054
Bias 0.50 50 15 15 No Yes -0.175 -0.113 -0.205 -0.170 -0.002
RMSE 0.50 50 15 15 No Yes 0.181 0.119 0.213 0.177 0.056
Design 4
Bias 0.25 50 15 15 Yes Yes -0.359 -0.313 -0.176 -0.058 0.000
RMSE 0.25 50 15 15 Yes Yes 0.361 0.314 0.186 0.075 0.051
Bias 0.50 50 15 15 Yes Yes -0.367 -0.317 -0.186 -0.378 -0.002
RMSE 0.50 50 15 15 Yes Yes 0.369 0.318 0.195 0.381 0.054
Design 5
Bias 0.25 50 15 5 Yes Yes -0.395 -0.340 -0.188 -0.281 -0.023
RMSE 0.25 50 15 5 Yes Yes 0.401 0.344 0.208 0.288 0.092
Bias 0.50 50 15 5 Yes Yes -0.425 -0.383 -0.212 -0.288 -0.085
RMSE 0.50 50 15 5 Yes Yes 0.429 0.386 0.228 0.292 0.119
Table A.1: Simulation results under fixed left- and right- censoring (double censoring). The
table shows the bias and root mean square error (RMSE) of different estimators.
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τ n m m¯ sij 6⊥: Quantile Estimators
uij αi QR FEQR IVQR PH PQDC
Design 1
Bias 0.25 20 15 15 No No -0.114 -0.122 -0.118 -0.101 -0.005
RMSE 0.25 20 15 15 No No 0.129 0.133 0.144 0.128 0.097
Bias 0.25 20 50 50 No No -0.108 -0.120 -0.109 -0.078 0.005
RMSE 0.25 20 50 50 No No 0.113 0.124 0.120 0.091 0.055
Bias 0.25 50 50 50 No No -0.123 -0.134 -0.126 -0.100 -0.001
RMSE 0.25 50 50 50 No No 0.125 0.135 0.130 0.103 0.032
Bias 0.50 20 15 15 No No -0.115 -0.117 -0.126 -0.125 -0.005
RMSE 0.50 20 15 15 No No 0.128 0.127 0.147 0.140 0.083
Bias 0.50 20 50 50 No No -0.123 -0.127 -0.123 -0.104 -0.007
RMSE 0.50 20 50 50 No No 0.126 0.130 0.131 0.111 0.044
Bias 0.50 50 50 50 No No -0.111 -0.118 -0.109 -0.107 -0.001
RMSE 0.50 50 50 50 No No 0.112 0.120 0.113 0.110 0.026
Design 2
Bias 0.25 20 15 15 Yes No -0.299 -0.310 -0.082 -0.071 -0.016
RMSE 0.25 20 15 15 Yes No 0.304 0.314 0.116 0.109 0.090
Bias 0.25 20 50 50 Yes No -0.286 -0.299 -0.076 -0.070 -0.002
RMSE 0.25 20 50 50 Yes No 0.288 0.300 0.092 0.083 0.048
Bias 0.25 50 50 50 Yes No -0.285 -0.308 -0.076 -0.059 0.000
RMSE 0.25 50 50 50 Yes No 0.285 0.308 0.083 0.065 0.030
Bias 0.50 20 15 15 Yes No -0.279 -0.297 -0.039 -0.287 0.010
RMSE 0.50 20 15 15 Yes No 0.284 0.301 0.098 0.293 0.088
Bias 0.50 20 50 50 Yes No -0.282 -0.294 -0.067 -0.292 0.007
RMSE 0.50 20 50 50 Yes No 0.283 0.295 0.082 0.294 0.044
Bias 0.50 50 50 50 Yes No -0.298 -0.314 -0.081 -0.293 -0.003
RMSE 0.50 50 50 50 Yes No 0.299 0.314 0.087 0.294 0.026
Design 3
Bias 0.25 20 15 15 No Yes -0.153 -0.120 -0.159 -0.098 -0.006
RMSE 0.25 20 15 15 No Yes 0.165 0.131 0.182 0.127 0.094
Bias 0.25 20 50 50 No Yes -0.131 -0.117 -0.149 -0.079 0.004
RMSE 0.25 20 50 50 No Yes 0.136 0.120 0.157 0.092 0.055
Bias 0.25 50 50 50 No Yes -0.145 -0.131 -0.161 -0.100 0.000
RMSE 0.25 50 50 50 No Yes 0.146 0.132 0.164 0.104 0.033
Bias 0.50 20 15 15 No Yes -0.167 -0.117 -0.192 -0.175 -0.003
RMSE 0.50 20 15 15 No Yes 0.178 0.127 0.209 0.190 0.081
Bias 0.50 20 50 50 No Yes -0.141 -0.125 -0.151 -0.129 -0.005
RMSE 0.50 20 50 50 No Yes 0.145 0.127 0.158 0.134 0.046
Bias 0.50 50 50 50 No Yes -0.138 -0.117 -0.152 -0.136 -0.001
RMSE 0.50 50 50 50 No Yes 0.140 0.118 0.155 0.139 0.025
Table A.2: Monte Carlo results for Designs 1, 2 and 3 under fixed left- and right- censoring
(double censoring).
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τ n m m¯ sij 6⊥: Quantile Estimators
uij αi QR FEQR IVQR PH PQDC
Design 4
Bias 0.25 20 15 15 Yes Yes -0.344 -0.315 -0.134 -0.060 -0.006
RMSE 0.25 20 15 15 Yes Yes 0.349 0.319 0.160 0.098 0.087
Bias 0.25 20 50 15 Yes Yes -0.322 -0.312 -0.117 -0.041 0.005
RMSE 0.25 20 50 15 Yes Yes 0.324 0.313 0.130 0.061 0.050
Bias 0.25 50 50 15 Yes Yes -0.324 -0.313 -0.133 -0.064 0.001
RMSE 0.25 50 50 15 Yes Yes 0.324 0.314 0.138 0.068 0.027
Bias 0.50 20 15 15 Yes Yes -0.349 -0.299 -0.165 -0.360 -0.001
RMSE 0.50 20 15 15 Yes Yes 0.354 0.303 0.185 0.366 0.078
Bias 0.50 20 50 15 Yes Yes -0.316 -0.306 -0.123 -0.314 -0.002
RMSE 0.50 20 50 15 Yes Yes 0.317 0.307 0.131 0.316 0.042
Bias 0.50 50 50 15 Yes Yes -0.319 -0.304 -0.125 -0.326 -0.001
RMSE 0.50 50 50 15 Yes Yes 0.320 0.305 0.129 0.326 0.023
Design 5
Bias 0.25 20 15 5 Yes Yes -0.453 -0.385 -0.265 -0.324 -0.036
RMSE 0.25 20 15 5 Yes Yes 0.467 0.394 0.311 0.341 0.180
Bias 0.25 20 50 16 Yes Yes -0.374 -0.350 -0.182 -0.303 -0.012
RMSE 0.25 20 50 16 Yes Yes 0.378 0.353 0.207 0.307 0.087
Bias 0.25 50 50 16 Yes Yes -0.337 -0.317 -0.130 -0.292 -0.013
RMSE 0.25 50 50 16 Yes Yes 0.339 0.319 0.146 0.294 0.053
Bias 0.50 20 15 5 Yes Yes -0.426 -0.394 -0.205 -0.321 -0.094
RMSE 0.50 20 15 5 Yes Yes 0.438 0.404 0.258 0.336 0.176
Bias 0.50 20 50 16 Yes Yes -0.336 -0.317 -0.147 -0.291 -0.016
RMSE 0.50 20 50 16 Yes Yes 0.341 0.320 0.174 0.295 0.071
Bias 0.50 50 50 16 Yes Yes -0.349 -0.333 -0.134 -0.305 -0.025
RMSE 0.50 50 50 16 Yes Yes 0.351 0.334 0.151 0.307 0.053
Table A.3: Monte Carlo results for Designs 4 and 5 under fixed left- and right- censoring
(double censoring).
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B Appendix B: Supplementary Tables
Variables Description
Relative bid Bid divided by the engineer’s cost estimate
Relative winning bid Winning bid divided by the engineer’s cost estimate
Number of employees This is the number of employees per establishment for a given month
Number of months in the market This indicates the number of months survived during the sample period
Engineer cost estimate Value of the engineer’s cost estimate
Number of plan holders Number of plan holders in an auction
Winning bid The lowest bid on an awarded project
Complexity The total number of bid items (project components) in a project
Active projects Firm’s projects that are still under construction
Complexity in active projects Average number of bid items in active projects
Backlog Constructed by summing across the incomplete
value of the contract for ongoing projects
Capacity utilization Project backlog divided by the maximum
backlog of that firm (or establishment)
Initial number of employees Number of employees at the initial month of entry
Size Logarithm of total employment
Highway cost index Highway cost index is a composite indicator covering the unit costs
(weighted sum of items) of excavation, resurfacing, and construction, and reflects cost
changes for materials such as reinforcing steel, bituminous
concrete, portland cement and other ingredients for highway
projects across Texas counties
Cost index of active The cost index of the projects was obtained using the highway
projects cost index ctk of different tasks k provided by TxDOT.
The firm’s weighted cost is c¯it=
∑
k λitkctk, where
λk represents a weight determined by the composition of tasks.
Unemployment rate The monthly unemployment rate in Texas
Single-family building permits Number of single family units approved by the county for a given year
Project type dummies Indicators for asphalt paving projects, bridge, and other projects
including drainage and erosion control, concrete, traffic, etc.
Cohort effects Indicators for firms’ entry year
Table B.1: Variable definitions. The data sources are: Texas Department of Transportation
(TxDOT), Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) from Texas Workforce
Commission, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, and US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
38
C Appendix C: Additional Results
In this section, we present additional results to evaluate the robustness of the excluded exoge-
nous variables in the control function approach. The results are presented in Figure C.1. As
in the previous figures, the quantiles of the conditional duration distribution are denoted by
τ . The continuous dotted lines show estimates obtained from the PQRC estimator proposed
in this paper that uses the change in the number of single family units approved by building
permits in a given year and number of plan holders in active projects as excluded exogenous
variables to estimate the control function (IV Set 1). The shaded regions represent a 90 per-
cent point-wise confidence interval. The other lines represent PQRC estimates using county
unemployment rate before a plant enters the market and number of plan holders in active
projects (IV Set 2) as excluded exogenous variables, and total volume of projects in Texas
and number of plan holders in active projects (IV Set 3) as excluded exogenous variables.
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Figure C.1: Sensitivity of quantile regression results to the choice of the control variates.
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